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Rational Religion and Toleration 
Ralph Cudworth and Other Platonists 
DIANA STANCIU 
 
 
 
 
 
In A Sermon Preached Before the Honourable House of Commons on March 31st, 
16471, Ralph Cudworth insisted that humans ”truly know Christ” when and only 
when they ”keep his commandments”2. As he put it, ”the sons of Adam are now as 
busy as ever himself was about the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil, shaking 
the boughs of it and scrambling for the fruit, whilst […] many are too unmindful of 
the Tree of Life”3. He disapproved of the ”bookish Christians”, that ”have all their 
religion in writings and papers” as if religion were ”nothing but a little book-craft, 
a mere paper-skill”4. The ”vulgar sort” – he continued – ”think that they know 
Christ enough out of their Creeds, and Catechisms, and Confessions of Faith”. The 
”more learned”, if they can but ”wrangle and dispute about Christ, imagine them-
selves to be grown great proficients in the school of Christ”5. The greatest part of 
the world, wheather learned or unlearned, ”think that there is no need of purging 
and purifying their hearts for the right knowledge of Christ and his Gospel” and 
that they may know Christ sufficiently ”out of their mere systems and bodies of di-
vinity” which are themselves useful, but ”in a subordinate way”6. 
The truth is, Cudworth maintained, that ”our Saviour prescribed his disciples 
another method to come to the right knowledge of Divine Truths, by doing of 
God’s will”. The true Christian is not only ”book-taught”, but ”God-taught”. Ink 
and paper can never make us Christians, can never ”beget a new nature, a living 
principle in us”7 that makes our heart be into an absolute conformity with the 
word of God. And later Cudworth continues: ”Christ came not into the world to 
fill our heads with mere speculations, to kindle a fire of wrangling and contentious 
dispute amongst us and to warm our spirits against one another […] Christ came 
not to possess our brains only with some cold opinions […] Christ was Vitae Mag-
ister, not Scholae […]”8. We do not know Christ indeed ”by our acquaintance with 
systems and models of divinity, not by our skill in books and papers, but by our 
keeping of Christ’s commandments”. All the books and writings can but represent 
”spiritual objects to our understandings […] which yet we can never see in their 
own true figure, colour and proportion until we have a divine light within, to irra-
                                                
1 Ralph CUDWORTH, A Sermon Preached Before the Honourable House of Commons on March 
31, 1647, being a Day of Public Humiliation, Thomas Hodgson, Liverpool and Edmund Fry, 
London, 1831. 
2 Ibidem, p. 2. 
3 Ibidem, p. 1. 
4 Ibidem, p. 2. 
5 Ibidem, p. 3. 
6 Ibidem. 
7 Ibidem, p. 4. 
8 Ibidem, p. 11. 
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diate and shine upon them”1. If there is a flesh and a spirit, a body and a soul in all 
the writings of the scriptures, ”it is but the flesh and body of divine truths that is 
printed upon paper”2. The soul and spirit of divine truths can dwell nowhere ”but 
in a spiritual being, in a living thing, because itself is nothing but life and spirit”3. 
To conclude, Cudworth contends that holiness is ”the conformity of our wills 
to the will of God”, ”our direct participation in the will of God, not necessarily me-
diated by our intellect”4. Our happiness does not merely reside in abstract knowl-
edge, but rather in a ”certain divine temper” and ”constitution of soul” which is far 
above it. It is ”a piece of that corruption that runs through human nature – he ex-
plains – that we naturally prize truth more than goodness, knowledge more than 
holiness”5. Perfect happiness consists in nothing but ”obedience to the divine will”. 
Happiness is nothing but that ”inward sweet delight” that will arise from the har-
monious agreement between our wills and God’s will6. 
One may think here of Cudworth’s Platonic stand that made him conceive the 
divine ”with a certain latitude”. As in Plato the concept of ”aitia” implies on the 
one hand the One and Perfect, ”to hen agathon”, but on the other hand includes 
also ”nous” and ”psyche”, Cudworth finds this latitude in the divine through the 
Trinity. The immediate consequence is that Ethics, Aesthetics, Logic and Religion 
are inseparable from each other and are ultimately one7. The finite life and thought 
participate in the Absolute in a comprehensive manner. It is not only logical de-
duction that leads to the true knowledge of God, but the complete human being 
into a complete identification with the Creator. 
Moreover, since in thinking we depend upon experience, it is impossible for 
our knowledge to proceed in a linear progression. No system can therefore be built 
up by the method of deduction alone. The whole is never given to us, it cannot be-
come the object, either of knowledge or of doubt. Therefore, in knowledge we pro-
ceed from one problem to another, but we have the possibility, from whatever par-
ticular problem we may start, to push through to the centre of all knowledge, the 
knowledge of the Perfect8. 
One may also sense here a veiled criticism of Descartes’s deductive method, 
although initially Cudworth and the whole group of Cambridge Platonists9 he was 
                                                
1 Ibidem, p. 32. 
2 Ibidem, p. 33. 
3 Ibidem. 
4 Cf. Lydia GYSI, Platonism and Cartesianism in the Philosophy of Ralph Cudworth, Herbert 
Lang, Bern, 1962, p. 158. 
5 Ralph CUDWORTH, A Sermon…cit., p. 16. 
6 Ibidem.  
7 Cf. Lydia GYSI, Platonism and Cartesianism…cit., p. 156. 
8 Ibidem. 
9 The Cambridge Platonists were fellows or students of two colleges in Cambridge: Christ’s 
and Emmanuel. Benjamin Whichcote (1609-83), Henry More (1614-87), Ralph Cudworth (1617-88) 
and John Smith (1618-52) formed the inner circle of the movement and Benjamin Whichcote 
seems to have been the leading figure among them. There was also an outer circle of thinkers 
outside Cambridge and some latitudinarian divines could be themselves counted among 
the Cambridge Platonists. Other contemporaries associated with the group were Nathaniel 
Culverwell (1619-51) and Peter Sterry (1613-72). Among their younger followers can be counted 
George Rust (d. 1670), John Norris (1657-1711) and Anne Conway (c. 1630-79). Two other kindred 
spirits could be Joseph Glanville (1638-80) and Jeremy Taylor (1613-67). But even the four main 
thinkers of the group were actually more independent of one anther than the label of ”Cambridge 
Platonism” may imply. Their criticism of Hobbes’s philosophy served more, perhaps, than 
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part of hailed Cartesianism as the modern philosophy most likely to link their the-
istic demands and the mechanical view of nature upheld by the new philosophy. 
Later they discovered that Cartesianism was more ”mechanical” than ”transcen-
dent” and, consequently, not suitable for studying the phenomena of the world. 
The ”assistence of a substance distinct from the matter, that is, of a spirit or being 
incorporeal” was considered necessary by More, for instance1. And, as we have al-
ready seen before, Cudworth himself emphasised it when asserting that the soul 
and spirit of divine truths ”can dwell nowhere but in a spiritual being, in a living 
thing, because itself is nothing but life and spirit”2. 
Upon a more detailed analysis of their epistemological frame of reference and 
considering the opposition expressed by the Cambridge Platonists against empiri-
cism, one can observe that, anticipating Leibniz and Kant, Cudworth3 and More4 
frequently pointed out that the conditions of knowledge cannot be satisfied by the 
senses. Knowledge requires judgment (which the senses cannot provide), univer-
sality and necessity (while the senses show us only particularity and contingency), 
knowledge demands activity (while senses are passive since sensations should 
conform to innate laws), knowledge requires the identity of the knower and the 
known, reason’s contemplation of its own creations (while the object of senses is 
given, distinct from the knower). 
Thus, contrary to empiricism, the Cambridge Platonists advocated a rationalist 
paradigm of knowledge. For instance, Cudworth maintains that true knowledge 
derives from deduction, being a descending comprehension of things from univer-
sal ideas and not an ascending perception of them from the senses. Cambridge Pla-
tonists’ view on innate ideas was the apparent target of Locke’s famous polemic. 
                                                
anything to unite them. The common element in their thinking was a liberal theological outlook 
rather than a consistent set of philosophical doctrines. In epistemology, the Cambridge Platonists 
were critics of empiricism, stressing the role of reason in knowledge. They also criticized conven-
tionalism and held there are essential or natural distinctions between things. In metaphysics, 
Cambridge Platonism is considered the most systematic attempt in seventeenth century English 
thought to reconcile reason and faith, the new natural philosophy and Christian revelation. 
Accepting the methods and naturalism of the new sciences, they nevertheless opposed their 
mechanical model of explanation because it seemed to leave no room for spirit, God and life. In 
ethics, Cambridge Platonists defended moral realism and freedom of the will against the 
voluntarism and determinism of Hobbes and Calvin. They seem to have provided the inspiration 
behind latitudinarianism and ethical rationalism.  
1 See the letter of More to Boyle from 4 Dec. 1665, quoted in C.A. PATRIDES (ed.), The 
Cambridge Platonists, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1969, p. 30, n. 3. 
2 Ralph CUDWORTH, A Sermon…cit., p. 11. 
3 Works of Ralph CUDWORTH, The True Intellectual System of the Universe, Richard 
Royston, London, 1678; Facsim. Fromamm, Stuttgart, 1964; Reprint, ed. G.A.J. ROGERS, 
Thoemmes Press, Bristol, 1995, 3 vols.; A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, J & J 
Knapton, London, 1731; Reprint, ed. S. HUTTON, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1996; A Treatise of Freewill, ed. John ALLEN, London, 1838; Reprint, ed. S. HUTTON, Thoemmes 
Press, Bristol, 1996.  
4 Works of Henry MORE: Enthusiasmus Triumphatus, J. Flesher, London, 1656, in Opera 
Omnia, J. Maycock for J. Martyn & W. Kettilby, London, 1675-79, 3 vols.; Reprint, G. Olms, 
Hildesheim, 1966, 2 vols. in 3 tomes, t. II, 2; An Explanation of the Grand Mystery of Godliness, 
J. Flesher, London, 1660, in Opera Omnia, t. I; Enchiridion Ethicum, London, 1667, in Opera Omnia, 
t. II, 1; Divine Dialogues, London, 1668, in Opera Omnia, t. II, 1; Enchiridion Metaphysicum, 
London, 1671, in Opera Omnia, t. II, 1; all these also to be found in A Collection of Several 
Philosophical Writings, London, 1662; Reprint Garland, New York and London, 1978. See also The 
Conway Letters, ed. M. NICOLSON, rev. S. HUTTON, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992.  
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But Cudworth and More explicitely rejected the view that the mind has pre-formed 
ideas prior to experience. They understood ”innatedness” in terms of the inherent 
activities and faculties of the mind and stressed that these had to be stimulated 
by experience. 
Moreover, both Cudworth and More criticised Descartes’ radical scepticism, 
that posed a serious challenge to the rationalism of the Cambridge School. Their 
views can be summarised like this: 
1) Descartes could not escape his radical doubt by his proof of the existence 
of God since such a demonstration presupposes the truth of our faculties; 
2) a false premise behind Cartesian doubt was that knowledge requires the 
correspondence between concepts and an external reality; since reason creates its 
object in the act of knowing, we need not seek truth outside ourselves (the Aristo-
telian theory of truth as correspondence between concepts and things, propositions 
and facts is challenged here); 
3) finally, we have no general reason to doubt our faculties if they normally 
supply clear and distinct ideas on specific occasions. 
All things considered, I would observe here that Cambridge Platonists had 
quite an ambivalent attitude towards the new natural philosophy. While they ad-
mired its methods of observation and experiment, shared its distaste for the verbi-
age of the old scholasticism and accepted its naturalism and its belief that every-
thing conforms to the law, they also feared the consequences of the new mechani-
cal model of explanation provided by Descartes or Boyle. 
Cudworth and More insisted that mechanism alone cannot account for such 
phenomena as gravity and cohesion in the material world, or generation and 
growth in the organic world. To explain them, they postulated the existence of a 
”plastic power” or ”spirit of nature”, a concept deriving from that of ”logoi sper-
matikoi” or ”rationes seminales” of the Stoic and Neoplatonic tradition and also 
from the Platonic ”anima mundi”. This concept posits a living force within matter, 
a self-generating and self-organizing power, subconscious, but still purposive, the 
instrument of God himself, the means by which he achieves his ends in the mate-
rial world. This spirit is not an occult force and it avoids the extremes of super-
naturalism, since it admits constant miracle in nature, and mechanism, since it de-
rives design from chance. Only the ”plastic power” explains design according to 
the requirements of naturalism. 
More claimed that the dangers of the new mechanism are obvious in Des-
cartes’ distinction between mind and body as thinking and extended substance. If 
only matter is extended, then spirit cannot exist. What is not extended cannot exist 
anywhere or in any place. Consequently, spirit is itself extended, its essential mat-
ter consisting of a fourth dimension – ”spissitude” – the power to expand or con-
tract the space it occupies. Infinite space is not the exclusive attribute of matter, it 
has many attributes in common with God himself and amounts to divine presence 
in nature itself. 
However, in spite of criticizing Cartesian dualism, Cambridge Platonists intro-
duced one of their own: they attributed opposing characteristics to spirit (which 
was indivisible, active and penetrable) and matter (which was divisible, passive 
and impenetrable). ”Plastic power” was postulated to uphold the continuity of na-
ture and it was also understood as a spiritual substance, distinct in kind from mat-
ter. Still, unlike the materialists of the 18th century, Cambridge Platonists did not 
employ this doctrine to show that mind and body differ only in degree as if they 
were more or less organized forms of living force. 
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Going back now to the sermon preached by Cudworth before the House of 
Commons, one may also infer, upon first reading it, that it is divine will and then 
divine grace he hints at as the only path to knowledge and, ultimately, salvation. 
Human free will is not mentioned at all. That ”divine light within” may be inter-
preted as divine grace itself and in that case the sermon may be taken as opposing 
some of the main ideas of the Cambridge Platonists. Needless to say that we have 
to take into account the style a sermon should display and the message it should 
contain especially when it is preached before the Parliament, where Oliver Crom-
well may have also been present, and when the preacher has the sum of £20 voted 
for him for ”a pains-taking and heart-searching sermon”1. But still the Cambridge 
Platonists are renowned for their anti-Hobbesian and anti-Calvinist views. And, 
again, if Cudworth advocated such ideas, why would he conceive later of ”an in-
tellectual system of the universe”? Beyond the milder tone used by Cudworth, 
what is the difference between his standpoint and Luther’s, for instance, in De servo 
arbitrio (On the Enslaved Will)? 
As it was already established by many scholars, the Reformation represented a 
thrust back upon the Augustinian conception of dogma. For Luther and Calvin, 
dogma became the real support and core of theology. The break with humanism was 
thus inevitable. The humanists’ defense of the autonomy of the will, which was not 
completely forfeited by the fall, seemed to Luther nothing less than an unmasked ex-
pression of religious skepticism. But Cudworth was against dogmatics, as we have 
seen. The dogmatics are presented in his sermon as ”the vulgar sort”, pursuing just 
”creeds, catechisms and confessions of faith” and considered even worse than those 
prone rather to mere deductions and not to true knowledge (”the more learned”). 
Where is the break then? What is the novelty? Is Cudworth providing us just with a 
milder version of the same ”dogmatic attitude” he is trying to condemn? 
A possible explanation would be that Cudworth published just two sermons: 
this one and A Sermon Preached to the Honourable Society of Lincolne’s Inne (1664) and 
both were circumstantial. The real core of his work are the treatises and even in his 
sermons, if we read between the lines, his attitude may show a certain flexibility of 
thought. For instance, the holiness that Cudworth advocates and that we have al-
ready referred to is ”nothing else but God stamped and printed upon the soul” 
since ”divine wisdom hath so ordered the frame of the whole universe, as that 
every thing should have a certain proper place, that should be a receptacle for it”2. 
He speaks now of ”divine will and commandments” and then of ”divine wisdom” 
and ”frame of the universe” and these latter notions are not completely different 
from his notions in The True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678). 
However, the matter is far from being clear and I think a possible key here 
would be the question I already formulated: Why did Ralph Cudworth conceive of 
an ”intellectual system of the universe”? And I would continue by asking: ”Why a 
system?” and ”Why intellectual?” The answer seems to refer to the three fundamen-
tals or essentials of true religion that he enlists at the very beginning of his treatise: 
1) that all things do not float without a head and governor; but there is a head 
and a governor, there is an omnipotent being presiding over all; 
2) that God has an essential goodness and justice and that the differences of 
good and evil, honest and dishonest are not by mere will and law only, but by 
                                                
1 Ralph CUDWORTH, A Sermon…cit., Preface. 
2 Ibidem, p. 40. 
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nature; and consequently, that the deity cannot act, influence and necessitate men 
to such things as are in their own nature evil (Thus God is but the efficient, not the 
formal cause of things); 
3) that necessity is not intrinsecal to the nature of everything; men have such a 
liberty or power over their own actions as may render them accountable for the 
same and blame-worthy when they do wrong; and consequently, that there is a 
justice distributive of rewards and punishments, running through the world1. 
Cudworth’s further explanations on the three points mentioned above can 
provide us with the answer: ”I say, these three (which are the most important things 
that the mind of man can employ itself upon) taken all together, make up the 
wholeness and entireness of that, which is here called by us The True Intellectual 
System of the Universe; in such a sense, as atheism may be called, a false system 
thereof: the word intellectual being added to distinguish it from the other, vulgarly 
so called, systems of the world (that is, the visible and corporeal world), the Ptole-
maic, Tychonic and Copernican; the two former of which are now commonly ac-
counted false, the latter true”2. And we could add here the ”systems and bodies of 
divinity”, the dogmatic religious views he referred to in his sermon. 
We may assume from this that ”an intellectual system” means for Cudworth a 
”system” that pertains, in genuine Platonic tradition, to the realm of the ”intelligi-
ble”, as opposed to that of the ”sensible”. And that hints also at the great ambitions 
of the work, that besides its tremendous length and scholarship, is intended to pro-
vide the foundation for true religion, rationally moral behaviour and tolerance while 
displaying a confutation of atheism, in spite of its author’s modest assertions: 
”And this we conceive may fully satisfy, concerning our general title, all 
those who are not extremely critical or captious, at least as many of them as 
have ever heard of the astronomical systems of the world: so that they will 
not think us hereby obliged, to treat of the hierarchy of angels and of all the 
several species of animals, vegetables and minerals, etc. […] that is, to write 
De Omni Ente, of whatsoever is contained within the complexion of the uni-
verse. Though the whole scale of entity is here also taken notice of”3. 
Seen from this perspective, the Sermon Preached Before the Honourable House of 
Commons seems rather to support the idea pointed out at the beginning that it is 
not only logical deduction that leads to the true knowledge of God, but the com-
plete human being into a complete identification with the Creator. And all this 
bears a great relevance on such matters as freedom of the will and tolerance. ”The 
intellectual system” thus devised is connected to the ”eternal and immutable mo-
rality” which is itself a pre-condition for tolerance. 
Cudworth was in fact writing his Intellectual System of the Universe against de-
terminism and predestination, considered to be the real dangers for all theisms. For 
Cudworth, as for all the other Cambridge Platonists, freedom of the will was the 
main imperative and he founded his defence of it on the law of nature, itself ex-
pressed in the power of reason every human being was endowed with. As he 
specified in his dedicatory note to Lord Finch, Cudworth was writing, in an age of 
                                                
1 Ralph CUDWORTH, The True Intellectual System of the Universe, facsimile edition pre-
pared by Bernard Fabian, Georg Olms, Hildesheim and New York, 1977, vol. I, Preface, p. 3. 
2 Ibidem. 
3 Ibidem. 
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so much ”debauchery, scepticism and infidelity”1, an apology (”apologia” – de-
fense of…), initially intended to be just a discourse concerning liberty and neces-
sity or, plainly, a ”discourse against the fatal necessity of all actions and events, 
which would serve the design of atheism and undermine Christianity and all relig-
ion” taking away ”all guilt and blame, punishments and rewards, and plainly ren-
dering a day of judgment ridiculous”2. 
Cudworth needs a ”system” of knowledge in order to convince men of their 
errors, but the truth provided by this system is supposed to be advocated and fol-
lowed with meekness and benevolence. Thus, again in A Sermon Preached Before the 
Honourable House of Commons on March 31, 1647, he insists that 
”The gospel at first came down upon the world gently and softly, like the 
dew upon Gideon’s fleece; and yet it quickly soaked quite through it; and 
doubtless this is still the most effectual way to promote it farther. Sweetness 
and ingenuity will more powerfully command mens’ minds than passion, 
sourness, and severity […] When we would convince men of any error by the 
strength of truth, let us withal pour the sweet balm of love upon their heads. 
Truth and love are two of the most powerful things in the world; and when 
they both go together, they cannot easily be withstood”3. 
And we should not forget this sermon was addressed to the Parliament, where 
Cromwell was probably present himself, especially when reading the next fragment: 
”Let us take heed we do not sometimes call that zeal for God and his Gos-
pel, which is nothing else but our own tempestuous and stormy passion. 
True zeal is a sweet, heavenly, and gentle flame, which makes us active for 
God, but always within the sphere of love. It never calls for fire from heaven 
to consume those that differ a little from us in their apprehensions. It is like 
that kind of lightning (which the philosophers speak of) that melts the sword 
within, but singeth not the scabbard: it strives to save the soul, but hurteth 
not the body. True zeal is a loving thing, and makes us always active to edifi-
cation, and not to destruction […] We may learn what kind of zeal it is that 
we should make use of in promoting the gospel, by an emblem of God’s own 
given us in the scripture, those fiery tongues that upon the day of Pentecost 
sat upon the apostles”4. 
Therefore in A Sermon Preached Before the Honourable House of Commons Cud-
worth remains within his ”intellectual system” – in the Platonic realm of the intelli-
gible, excluding passions and enthusiasm and that cannot but promote tolerance. It 
is not only that he intends to endorse an authentic knowledge of God, that keeps 
alive that ”divine light within” and gets beyond mere dogma or speculation, but 
he also tries to induce that spirit of tolerance that he felt his audience was missing. 
And leaving aside all the rhetoric and the apparent lack of interest for the issue 
of free will, I would remark here that the sermon briefly presents Cudworth’s main 
ideas in his philosophic treatises the way ”Letter 19” addressed by Marsilio Ficino5 
                                                
1 Ibidem, Dedicatory note. 
2 Ibidem, Preface, p. 1. 
3 IDEM, A Sermon…cit., pp. 50-51. 
4 Ibidem, p. 51. 
5 Marsilio Ficino (1433-99) was one of the most important philosophers working under the 
patronage of the Medici family in Florence during the High Renaissance. Ficino has been renown 
as a translator of Platonic philosophy from Greek into Latin. He offered the first complete Latin 
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to John of Hungary (whoever he may have been)1, almost two hundred years 
before, expresses in a nutshell some of its author’s ideas in important works of 
his such as Theologia Platonica (Platonic Theology) or De christiana religione (On Chris-
tian Religion). 
Why do I refer here to Ficino though? And which were these ideas very well 
expressed in ”Letter 19” that we also find in Ficino’s main works? I refer to Ficino 
because he wrote against atheism or irreligious modes of thought as well as Cud-
worth. As ”Letter 19” may prove, he even used sometimes the same arguments 
as Cudworth: 
”For the whole world was seized by the Aristotelians and divided for the 
most part into two schools of thought, the Alexandrian and the Averroist. 
The Alexandrians consider our intellect to be subject to death, while the 
Averroists maintain that there is only one intellect. They both equally under-
mine the whole of religion”2. 
In his Theologia platonica de immortalitate animae (Platonic Theology: On the Im-
mortality of the Soul) (1474), Ficino defends religion against Epicurean and Lucretian 
free-thinkers, who wish to explain religion from pathological states, political fac-
tors or the influence of the stars. Generally, Ficino’s most important philosophical 
work, was designed to use Platonic arguments to combat the Averroists, ”impi-
ous” scholastic philosophers who denied that the immortality of the soul could be 
proven by reason. He believed that religious belief in his day was under threat 
from the growing estrangement of piety from philosophy. On the one hand there 
were the priests and other religious authorities, too ignorant of philosophy to de-
fend Christianity; on the other hand there were the impious university philoso-
phers, chiefly those whom Ficino labelled the ”Averroists” and ”Alexandrians” 
(meaning followers of Averroes’ and Alexander of Aphrodisias’ interpretations of 
Aristotle), who denied the ability of philosophy to prove such central canons of the 
faith like the immortality of the soul. 
In Ficino’s view, the medieval attempt to integrate Christianity and Aristotelian 
philosophy had reached no satisfactory conclusion. Ficino considered that the best 
way to resist the growing autonomy of philosophy from religion in the schools was 
neither to retreat to fideism nor to seek a more successful Christian interpretation of 
Aristotle, but to replace Aristotle with Plato as the primary philosophical authority 
of Christendom. It was Ficino’s belief that Plato, who had believed in creation and in 
the immortality of the soul, would provide a better foundation for Christian belief 
than Aristotle, who had believed in the eternity of the world and had proved quite 
                                                
version of the works of Plato (1484) and Plotinus (1492). His translations also contain his own 
philosophical commentaries and these exercised a great influence on the interpretation of Platonic 
philosophy in the Renaissance and early modern period.  
1 Cf. Biographical notes in The Letters of Marsiglio Ficino, Vol. 7 (Book 8), transl. from 
Latin by the members of the Language Department of the School of Economic Science, 
Shepheard-Walwyn, London, 2003, p. 200. The identity of the person sending ”Letter 18” and 
receiving ”Letter 19” has been much discussed. Among the candidates was Janus Pannonius, 
Bishop of Pécz (1434-1472), but he died before the presumed exchange of these letters (1485). It 
could also be János Vitéz, the nephew of János Vitéz, Archbishop of Esztergom (1408-1472). But, 
there is still a further possibility: that the exchange of letters be only partly based on actual 
correspondence and represent rather a literary device. Ficino may have remembered his 
discussions with Janus Pannonius in the 1460s and may have written the letter much later. 
2 ”Letter 19”, in The Letters of Marsiglio Ficino, cit., p. 22. 
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unclear on the immortality question. In this, Ficino was supported by the authority 
of Augustine himself, who in De civitate Dei (The City of God) had declared Plato to be 
the pagan philosopher closest to the spirit of Christianity. 
One should add here that Ficino’s concept of universal religion had a great im-
pact on the Cambridge Platonists in general and specifically on Cudworth’s idea of 
rational religion although Cudworth never quoted Ficino. Upon a more subtle 
analysis, Ficino’s idea of universal religion could even provide the link between 
Cudworth’s ”intellectual system of the universe” and his ”eternal and immutable 
morality”, which later becomes for him a pre-condition for tolerance. 
Moreover, Ficino himself emphasized the importance of reason in religion: 
”It pleases divine Providence in these times [of irreligion] to strengthen 
the very substance of her own religion with philosophical authority and rea-
son until, at an appointed time, she confirms the truest form of religion with 
miracles manifesting among all peoples, as she did in times past”1. 
For Ficino as well as for Cudworth religion was founded on natural reason. 
And I will explain these assertions in what follows. 
Ficino’s idea that ”the primitive theology of the Gentiles” had begun with Zo-
roaster or perhaps with the mythical Hermes Trismegistus, had then passed to Or-
pheus and Pythagoras and several others and had at last found ”its way entire” 
into the books of ”our Plato” is already well known and much debated2. In ”Letter 
19” it is expressed like this: 
”Therefore, because divine Providence wills to recall all people to herself 
in a wonderful way, according to their individual natures, it happened that a 
certain holy philosophy was born in times past both among the Persians un-
der Zoroaster and among the Egyptians under Hermes, her sound true to 
herself in both peoples. She was subsequently nurtured among the Thracians, 
under Orpheus and Aglaophemus, and soon grew to maturity, under Py-
thagoras, among the peoples of Greece and Italy. But it was by divine Plato in 
Athens that she was finally brought to perfection”3. 
This idea was formulated with such precision and imagination by none of the 
Cambridge Platonists, but a variant of it appears to be implicit in Cudworth’s True 
Intellectual System and it was once outlined by More in the following lines: 
”Plato’s school 
[…] well agrees with learned Pythagore, 
Egyptian Trismegist, and th’ antique roll 
Of Chaldee wisdome, all which time hath tore 
But Plato and deep Plotin do restore”4. 
The idea of a universal religion preached by the Platonists of Florence spread 
from Renaissance Italy all over Europe. It influenced the poetry and aesthetic 
                                                
1 Ibidem, p. 23. 
2 Marsilio FICINO, De christiana religione, Ch. XXII, p. 25, quoted and discussed in Gunar 
ASPELIN, Ralph Cudworth’s Interpretation of Greek Philosophy: A Study in the History of English 
Philosophical Ideas, Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, Göteborg, 1943, pp. 33 sq. Numerous other 
scholars discuss this idea. See also C.A. PATRIDES (ed.), The Cambridge Platonists, cit., pp. 6 sq.  
3 ”Letter 19”, in The Letters of Marsiglio Ficino, cit., p. 22. 
4 Henry MORE, ”Psychozoia”, I.4, in Philosophical Poems of Henry More, ed. by Geoffrey 
BULLOUGH, Manchester, 1931, p. 12. 
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thought of the Elisabethan Age. And More himself was an enthusiastic admirer of 
Spenser’s Faery Queen, the influence of this famous author of the English Renais-
sance epic being obvious exactly in More’s poem Psychozoia (or The Life of the 
Soul)1. The doctrine of the Greek philosophy as a continuation of the ancient wis-
dom of the Orient can be also found with Frenchmen like Symphorien Champier, 
with Germans like Reuchlin or with Italians like Augustinus Steuchus Eugubinus 
and Francisco Patrizzi. 
The existence of a continued tradition is here the essential matter these authors 
wanted to point out and it stays in good connection to the very Platonic idea of 
knowledge as ”anamnesis”. We find the idea of a continued tradition and of theol-
ogy and philosophy built on revelation with Roger Bacon as well. Joseph Glanville 
himself, in spite of being a defender of the ideal of science and of the new philoso-
phy of Francis Bacon and Descartes, invokes sometimes the principle of tradition 
and age (especially regarding the Aristotelians). Where Cudworth develops his 
speculations (in The True Intellectual System of the Universe) concerning the history 
of the philosophy of religion in Antiquity, he follows the lines of thought of Ficino 
and of later Renaissance humanists. In his battle against atheism, he wishes to 
show that faith in a Supreme Being belongs to the most ancient and universal phi-
losophy of mankind. 
What is more important then, is the fact that, according to the Cambridge Plato-
nists, it was only by admitting an authentic transcendence that one could resist the 
kind of relativism that regarded all authority as an artificial creation. And this au-
thentic transcendence could only derive from the ”prisca theologia” – that ancient 
theology embodied, according to the tradition of Florentine Platonists, in the teach-
ings of Moses, Zoroaster, Pythagoras, Plato and even Aristotle sometimes2. The Pla-
tonic framework allowed the eternal truths to be set against the supposed creation of 
those truths. Morality was itself concerned with the immutable nature of justice, 
which was never arbitrary. (The idea originated, in fact, in Plato’s Euthyphro – moral 
good and evil could not be arbitrary things, made by will without nature3.) 
In the same train of thought, Cudworth’s main work on ethics, his Treatise 
Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, aims to prove that there did exist, as he 
asserted after the words of Plato, ”something naturally and immutably good and 
just”4. Human virtue was not just a function of the social contract, Cudworth and 
all of the Cambridge Platonists maintained against Hobbes, but a separate, inde-
pendent quality found in every human being, although often obscured by the blur-
ring effect of circumstance and habit. 
                                                
1 Gunar ASPELIN, Ralph Cudworth’s Interpretation…cit., p. 10. 
2 However, in spite of keeping the old pattern in order to pursue his apologetic interests, 
Cudworth had somehow to take into account the critical philology developed by Isaac 
Casaubon and Gerhard Vossius. He cannot link historical series of events as the Florence 
academics, he has to explain his assumptions and argue in detail, although the arguments are 
not always solid enough since he is an authority in classical literature, but not in classical 
philology. He is nevertheless more cautious than the Renaissance Platonists. Cf. Gunar 
ASPELIN, Ralph Cudworth’s Interpretation…cit., pp. 36-45. 
3 See J.L. BRETEAU, ”Un grand espace pour la liberté: le dilemme du libre arbitre dans la 
pensée de Ralph Cudworth”, Archives de Philosophie, 58, 3 (1995), pp. 445-454. 
4 The treatise remained, like almost all his writings, an unfinished though massive one and 
it was not published until 1731, long after his death in 1688. See A Treatise Concerning Eternal and 
Immutable Morality, Georg Olms, Hildesheim and New York, 1979, p. 3. 
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As I have suggested before, in ethics, Cambridge Platonists’ realism and ra-
tionalism stemmed from the reaction against Hobbes’s and Calvin’s voluntarism 
(the thing’s eternal essence or nature, which exists independent of contract, con-
vention or will, makes something good or evil, not the will of some sovereign 
power – and this is also an idea I have already pointed out). Cambridge Platonists 
insisted that we know the nature of good/evil through reason alone and reason 
determines the means and ends of action. Still, they did not advocate an ethics of 
duty in the modern Kantian sense. They did not distinguish like Kant between ad-
herence to principle and conformity to nature. 
Cambridge Platonists also opposed Hobbes’s and Calvin’s determinism and 
defended freedom of the will. Moral responsibility was incompatible with the ne-
cessity prevalent in nature. They denied the view that human nature had been so 
corrupted by the Fall that it could not do good by its own efforts. Sin was a disor-
der, a corruption of an inherently good human nature. People were not naturally 
selfish and competitive. So, they stressed the social nature of man. Moral life alone 
brought happiness and fulfilment of a person. 
Moreover, action and not contemplation was the end of life and this can be 
discussed in relation to their general image of ”otherworldly” scholars. Highest 
knowledge was only the result of good conduct. This emphasis on reason, social 
nature of man, goodness of human nature constantly reappeared in the late 17th 
and early 18th century in most cases as a reaction to Hobbes views. For instance, 
Cambridge Platonists were particularly influential on Samuel Butler, the 3rd Earl of 
Shaftesbury and Richard Cumberland and they sometimes provided the inspira-
tion behind the ethical rationalism of Samuel Clarke, John Balguy and Richard 
Price. For example, in 1698, Shaftesbury brought out the first edition of Which-
cote’s Sermons, also writing a comprehensive preface to the book, and he was in-
spired by both Cudworth’s True Intellectual System of the Universe and More’s Enchi-
ridion ethicum in his Moralists and, respectively, Sensus Communis. 
Yet, instead of constructing an ethical theory per se, Cudworth, like many of 
the other Cambridge Platonists, devoted again most of his treatise on ”immutable 
morality” to an elaboration of the epistemology designed to reinforce his primary 
claim. Cudworth’s attempt to resist Hobbes’s materialist relativism and what he 
saw as the consequent disintegration of the traditional (that is the theological) 
bases supporting moral thought issued from the widely shared conviction among 
the Cambridge Platonists (as well as among Florentine Platonists before) that the 
fundamental characteristics of human mind were always and everywhere the 
same. In arguing for an unchanging morality, Cudworth insisted that we are given 
innately the essential capacities to acquire it. In analogy to the principles of mathe-
matics, Cudworth reasoned that we may come only late or never to learn the laws 
of algebra, but that our knowledge or ignorance of them in no way affects their in-
trinsic validity and permanence. 
The central idea was that, contrary to Hobbes’s theory, human reason was not 
the product of the material forces setting matter in motion and the mind was not 
simply the passive receptacle of randomly occurring external stimuli. If it were in-
deed the case that the mind possessed no active properties of its own, Cudworth 
insisted, then it would have been impossible for us ever to rise above the primitive 
level of pure sense perception. He wanted to show that there are some ideas of the 
mind which were not stamped or imprinted upon it from the sensible objects, and 
therefore they should arise from the innate activity of the mind itself such as the 
idea of wisdom, folly, prudence, imprudence, knowledge, ignorance, virtue, vice, 
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honesty, dishonesty, justice, injustice, volition, cogitation and reason itself, which 
is a species of cogitation, and which is not perceptible by any sense. 
And it is on this basis that anything like a universal system of ethics is at all 
possible. Thus, being part of the ”intellectual system”, since they are endowed 
with reason, which has indeed universal validity, humans may establish the 
so-called ”immutable morality” on the basis of their participation to the realm of 
the intelligible. As Edward Gibbon was later to observe, in the endeavour of the 
seventeenth-century philosophers ”to reconcile the jarring interests of reason and 
piety”, the relentless force of the former was destined finally to prevail1. 
Within the 17th-century dispute concerning the ”rule of faith” or the ultimate 
criterion of religious knowledge, the Cambridge Platonists stood firmly in the 
camp of reason. They opposed enthusiasm, which appealed to inspiration no less 
than Roman Catholic ”dogmatism”, when referring to apostolic tradition. But 
Cambridge Platonists defended reason conceived as a mystical faculty, as a power 
of vision guided by divine grace. As we have already seen, they opposed the for-
mal concept of reason prevalent in the nominalist tradition, where reason was seen 
as merely a power of inference. Reason was not just discursive reason, but a more 
elevated capacity of the mind. It corresponded to ”nous” or ”mens”, deriving its 
power from either reflection of or participation in the divine. 
Moreover, their concept of reason emphasised practical reason: the mind con-
tained within it the principles of moral conduct. Cambridge Platonists also rejected 
Socinianism because of its critical attitude towards the traditional Christian doc-
trine. Regarding the ecclesiastical polity, they chose a middle path between 
Laudianism and Puritanism, between High Church Anglicanism and Presbyterian-
ism. Anticipating the latitudinarians2, they emphasised the need for a comprehen-
sive church with a creed broad enough to accommodate all Christians. 
Consequently, in promoting tolerance, Cudworth argued on the basis of the 
rational order of the universe, promoted by Florentine Platonists as well, which 
made it intelligible and accessible to human intellect, not to the senses. He used the 
                                                
1 Edward GIBBON, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. J.B. Bury, 
Methuen, London, 1909-14; reprint, AMS Press, New York, 1974, I, 33. 
2 When referring to the latitudinarians, Glanville used to explain that ”latitude-men”or 
”latitudinarians” are words that signify compass or largeness because of their opposition to the 
narrow stingy temper then called Orthodoxness. In its worse sense, Latitudinarian went for 
”one of a large Conscience and Practice” (cf. Simon PATRICK, A Brief Account of the New Sect of 
Latitude-men, London, 1662, new edition by T.A. BIRELL, William Andrews Clark Memorial 
Library, Los Angeles, 1963). They usually insisted on the freedom of the will considering 
themselves people who lead an unblameable life but were not too scrupulous about the 
externals of religion. They neither joined the dissenters nor were prepared to cooperate 
wholeheartedly in the task of re-establishing a uniform Anglican liturgy and discipline within 
the university. The younger generation of latitude-men (Patrick, Fowler, Tillotson, Stillingfleet, 
Tenison, Sharp and Moore) were also Cambridge educated, but they all left the university and 
became preachers in London. The Cambridge Platonists’ mystical and metaphysical theology 
was quite different from the common-sense appeal to the experience of their congregations 
which characterised the Cambridge Platonists’ younger admirers. Nevertheless both groups 
shared a common desire to distinguish the inessentials from the irreducible bases of Christianity 
in order to reduce religious discord. After the Act of Uniformity (1662) and Locke’s Third Letter 
on Toleration (1692), against those who put coercive uniformity above pastoral care and moral 
discipline, after the collapse of the Restoration Church after the Toleration Act of 1689, the 
formerly harassed latitudinarians were induced to the episcopal bench. At the same time press 
censorship was put to an end in England. 
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”argument from design” where Locke would later use the “argument from igno-
rance” – our inability to settle a knowledge claim1. Then, it would be worth to ask 
ourselves what is the need for tolerance in Cudworth’s system, where individual 
or group differences were reduced to universal principles and the rational order of 
the universe was perceived through those principles which were the ”candle of the 
Lord” set up in the soul of every man that had not wilfully extinguished it. 
Indeed, one should not forget that Cudworth’s system was an ”intellectual” 
one – that is ideal. Tolerance was to be found or endorsed ”in the world” and the 
ideal system was to be acknowledged exactly by encouraging people “not to put 
out” that ”candle of the Lord” but to let it guide their everyday lives, which other-
wise would get disjointed in the multitude of differences and interests and in the 
conflicts raised by these differences and interests, leading to a hobbesian anarchic 
state of nature. 
Thus, the formerly common image of Cambridge Platonists as perfectly aloof, 
ivory-tower academics, retaining very little influence in the subsequent century2 is 
once more challenged. Placed in sharp contrast with the active commitment to the 
world promoted in Bacon’s philosophy, theirs was sometimes considered a 
”purely contemplative attitude, taken from the classical Hellenic ideal as it was 
found particularly in Plotinus”3. 
But more recently, the ”practical” dimension of their work, their moral and po-
litical concerns received more attention4 and the connections between their theories 
of knowledge, their physics and their metaphysics (together with their more intri-
cate, theological aspect) and their moral and political interests were emphasised, a 
certain coherence or harmony of their positions being simultaneously pointed out. 
New studies have been published on this matter and most of them start from 
the assumption that Cambridge Platonists were considerably aware of the political 
turmoil in which their philosophy was developing. Moreover, Cambridge Plato-
nists have lately been perceived as definitely trying to advocate political settlement 
in the unsettled years of mid-seventeenth century England. 
Some scholars agree at least that their philosophy was to offer some of the 
main ideas that promoted the advancement of religious tolerance in England and 
that their supposed lack of influence in the eighteenth-century thought was rather 
”an absorbtion of their ideas in the more wide-ranging validation of tolerance that 
was later to happen”5. Their influence on Butler, Shaftesbury, Cumberland, Clarke, 
Balguy, Price or the latitudinarians, discussed above, is already well documented. 
Whichever may be the truth, it is obvious anyway that neither Ralph Cud-
worth nor Henry More were writing treatises of theology and philosophy in an 
                                                
1 Unless one knows that he knows what the truth is on some matter, one should not 
attempt to force others to accept his opinion or to suppress those who propounded a view 
contrary to one’s own. 
2 See M.F. HOWARD, ed., notes and introd. to The Life of the Learned and Pious Dr. Henry 
More … by Richard Ward … 1710, London, 1911, pp. 33-34; Dean INGE, the Introduction to the 
Moral and Religious Aphorisms of Benjamin Whichcote, London, 1930, pp. III-IV; Rupert HALL, 
Henry More: Magic, Religion and Experiment, Blackwell, Oxford, 1990, p. 88.  
3 Ernst CASSIRER, The Platonic Renaissance in England, engl. trans. James P. Pettegrove, 
Nelson, Edinburgh, 1953, pp. 49-50. 
4 G.A.J. ROGERS, J.M. VIENNE and Y.C. ZARKA (eds.), The Cambridge Platonists in 
Philosophical Context: Politics, Metaphysics and Religion, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1997.  
5 John GASCOIGNE, Cambridge in the Age of the Enlightenment, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1989. 
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intellectual void. Although Platonic or Neo-Platonic philosophy was the main core 
of their inspiration, although they sometimes considered themselves as successors 
of the Platonic Academy in Florence, the Cambridge Platonists were also respond-
ing to a contemporary complex intellectual milieu fashioned by the New Science, 
associated especially with Galileo and Descartes, by the Civil War, threatening the 
two most important institutions of the time, the Church of England and the Monar-
chy, by the rise of ”enthusiasm” and also by the philosophy of Hobbes. Beyond all 
these, Cambridge during the Civil War and the Interregnum was hardly the place 
to favour an apolitical stand, especially when, in November 1643, the parliamen-
tary troops of the Earl of Manchester took over the University removing paintings 
and imprisoning members1. 
Moreover, most scholars agree that, since their work stood somehow between 
the system of Descartes and that of Leibniz, between rationalism and empiricism, 
between ancient and modern science, between religion and philosophy, the Cam-
bridge Platonists’ influence was to a certain extent seminal for the formation of 
modern thought and many of the questions they raised are still worth being pur-
sued. In fact, within the configuration of ideas specific to their time, they tried to 
connect the most incompatible trends and because of that their ideas were far less 
monolithic and much harder to classify than those of their contemporaries. 
Quite perplexing may be for the modern reader the theological aspect of their 
work, the system of concepts and metaphors in terms of which their religious, 
moral and political preoccupations were worked out. It seems nevertheless impos-
sible to understand the transition from one form of modernity – that proposed by 
Descartes – to the other equally important forms proposed by Leibniz, Newton or 
Locke, if one neglects the ideas advanced by the Cambridge Platonists. They are to 
be considered even if the only reason for that would be to understand how other 
thinkers elaborated their own systems by criticizing the Platonists. 
It became, then, a useful attempt for many students of Cambridge Platonism 
to approach it, as I have already noted, from a ”practical” perspective and to pre-
sent their thought as a reaction against various forms of voluntarism that prevailed 
at the time. As I have already pointed out, they were definitely writing against Cal-
vinism, which had emphasised predestination and moral legalism, but they were 
writing as well against the moral relativism and state absolutism generated by 
Hobbes’s theories. The Cambridge school was actually considered even by the con-
temporaries as the most able opponent of Hobbes’s philosophy2. 
Their doctrine of free will3, close to that of the latitudinarians’4, also aroused 
the interest of the Remonstrants in Holland, who were engaged in a struggle 
                                                
1 See J.B. MULLINGER, The University of Cambridge, vol. 3, Cambridge, 1911, Ch. 3., passim. 
2 See the account of a contemporary writer: Gilbert BURNET, History of My Own Time, 1st 
ed. 1723-34; Th. Ward, Oxford, 1833, 6 vols. 
3 See ”More, Locke and the Issue of Liberty”, in Sarah HUTTON (ed.), Henry More 
(1614-1687). Tercentenary Studies, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1990. 
4 However, the place of the Latitudinarians in the development of tolerance in England has 
been much debated. See, for instance, Richard ASHCRAFT, ”Latitudinarianism and Toleration”, in 
Philosophy, Science, and Religion in England, 1640-1700, ed. Richard KROLL, Richard ASHCRAFT 
and Perez ZAGORIN, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992. According to Ashcraft, 
the latitudinarians were loyal members of the Church of England, a church that insisted on 
providing a set body of doctrine, and thus they could not really believe in liberty of conscience. 
They stood in obvious contrast to the nonconformists. It was the nonconformists who accepted 
that every individual was made in the image of God and that each had reason and free will and 
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against rigorous Calvinist dogma and various forms of intolerance. The nature of 
this liberal morality can be elucidated by comparing the positions of the Arminians 
with those of the Cambridge Platonists. The correspondence of Cudworth and 
More, on the one hand, and the writings of van Limborch, the representative of 
Arminianism1, on the other hand, may be extremely useful in this sense. And all 
these are nothing but an invitation to a more thorough analysis of free will and tol-
erance as they were presented in the works of the Cambridge Platonists. 
 
 
                                                
was capable of acting morally according to his private judgment. And because of the special status 
of the conscience as God’s way of instruction in moral matters, his private judgment would 
indeed coincide with God’s will. By contrast, Anglicans – including Latitudinarians – denied the 
individuals’ right to follow the ”wild enthusiasms” of their minds. See also the contemporary 
account of Simon PATRICK, A Brief Account of the New Sect of Latitude-men, cit., n. 43. 
1 P. van LIMBORCH, Theologia Christiana ad praxin pietatis ac promotionem pacis Christianae 
unice directa, H. Wetstein, Amsterdam, 1686. See also R.L. COLIE, Light and Enlightenment: 
A Study of the Cambridge Platonists and the Dutch Arminians, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1957. 
